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This article identifies some of the potential legal and policy issues involved in the future 
regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. First, regulators must be cautious in the 
regulation and solvency of some mammoth clearing-houses. Second, Singapore and Hong Kong 
both face challenges in the areas of global regulatory cooperation and extra-territorial regulatory 
effects. Third, the exact scope of a clearing obligation determines whether there is any regulatory 
competition or room for regulatory arbitrage in the future. Fourth, there are legal definition 
problems with the term ‘derivative’ and its sub-categories that must be addressed. Fifth, there are 
potential privacy and civil liability issues in relation to trade reporting. We will continue to 






This paper discusses certain unresolved legal issues regarding the clearing and reporting of the 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives flowing from regulatory proposals in Singapore and Hong 
Kong. One of the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis has been the potential systemic 
risk in the collapse of a major derivatives dealer, because ‘applications of derivative instruments 
focus on using derivatives to transfer risk’.1 Therefore, derivatives allow market participants to 
transform one type of risk into credit risk for the contract’s counterparty,2 such that ‘[a]t the heart 
of the ongoing financial crisis lies one fundamental problem: credit’.3 
In an ideal world, risk would be redistributed to a wider range of market participants (much like 
insurance). In 2006, the International Monetary Fund observed that  
There is a growing recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and 
more diverse group of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on their balance sheet, 
has helped make the banking and overall financial system more resilient.4 
 
Nonetheless, the collapse of Lehman Brothers has shown that risk has not been redistributed, but 
rather it has been concentrated in several major dealers. The solution provided by the G20 has 
been to reduce counterparty risk through the mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives (‘clearing 
obligation’) via a central counterparty (CCP) and to improve the transparency of the opaque 
derivatives market through compulsory trading reporting (‘reporting obligation’) to control 
counterparty and systemic risks and improve the overall transparency of the market. These are 
the two main strings of OTC derivatives regulation in the current round of regulatory reform. 
As the Financial Services Authority in the UK recognises,  
                                                 
1 S Das, Structured Products Volume 1: Exotic Options; Interest Rates & Currency (3rd ed., rev 
edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 2006) 117.   
2 C Pirrong, ‘The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice’ 5, ISDA Discussion 
Papers Series Number 1 in <http://www2.isda.org/> accessed 14 March 2012; JC Kress, ‘Credit 
Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have 
Access to Central Bank Liquidity’ (2011) 48 Harv J on Legis 49, 66. 
3 EH Cadmus, ‘An Altered Derivatives Marketplace: Clearing Swaps under Dodd-Frank’ (2012) 
17 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 189, 189. 
4 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (April 2006) in 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=18690.0> accessed 30 April 2009. 
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“[t]he increased use of CCP clearing for an internationally defined set of ‘clearing eligible’ 
products is a key step in mitigating this risk. A CCP can impose consistent and robust risk 
management practices as well as act as a circuit breaker to the default of a member. In 
addition, greater use of CCP clearing can aid market liquidity and efficiency, be a motivating 
force behind contract standardisation, and reduce systemic risk.”5   
In the US, these regulations have been put forward by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.6 In Europe, a proposed regulation was published in 20107 while 
regulators in Hong Kong and Singapore, two of the main financial hubs in East and Southeast 
Asia, picked up the pace towards the close of 2011. Respectively, consultation papers were 
published by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (HKSFC) and the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority (HKMA) in October 20118 and by the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) in February 20129 to seek public opinions on how the OTC derivatives market should be 
regulated in the two cities. In Singapore, a proposal of amendments to the Securities and Futures 
Act for OTC derivatives has been published in a consultation paper issued on 23 May 2012.10 
These proposals in Asia have provided a backdrop for the comparison and consideration of 
future legal issues regarding OTC derivatives regulation.  
How to evaluate the proposed global framework for regulations of OTC derivatives is beyond the 
scope of this article.11 Instead, we will focus on certain main issues raised in proposals in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. In the following sections, we first briefly introduce the regulatory 
proposals in Singapore and Hong Kong and explain how centralised clearing works in OTC 
                                                 
5 FSA, ‘Reforming OTC Derivative Markets: A UK Perspective’ 4.12, FSA and HM Treasury 
Joint Paper in <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/reform_otc_derivatives.pdf>, accessed 25 June 
2012. 
6 Pub L 111-203, HR 4173. 
7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories, COM(2010) 484 final, 2010/0520(COD). 
8 See HKSFC, ‘Consultation paper on the proposed regulatory regime for the over-the-counter 
derivatives market in Hong Kong’ (Oct 2011) (‘HKSFC consultation paper). 
9 MAS Consultation Paper, ‘Proposed Regulation of OTC Derivatives’ (P003-2012, Feb 2012) 
(‘MAS consultation paper I’). 
10 MAS Consultation Paper, ‘Consultation Paper I on Proposed Amendments to the Securities 
and Futures Act on Regulation of OTC Derivatives’ (P008-2012, May 2012)(‘MAS consultation 
paper II’)  
11 See generally D Awrey , ‘The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-
private Divide’ (2010) 11(2) EBOR 155. 
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transactions. In Part III, we discuss some of the legal issues involved in the clearing and 
reporting of OTC derivative transactions and Part IV presents our conclusions.  
 
II. Regulatory Proposals in Singapore and Hong Kong 
A. The Proposal in Singapore 
The main issues involved in the regulation of the OTC derivatives market in Singapore are the 
‘clearing’ and ‘reporting’ mandates. To bolster these two mandates, additional legal changes 
have been proposed in relation to the regulatory framework for market operators (i.e., 
exchanges), clearing facilities (i.e., CCPs), trade repositories, and capital market intermediaries 
(i.e., major dealers).  
The clearing obligation can be broken down into three questions: (1) who must submit a trade to 
a CCP for clearing?; (2) to whom must a market participant submit a trade?; and (3) what must 
be submitted for clearing? Regarding the first question, the MAS proposes that all derivative 
contracts be required to seek clearance by a CCP if at least one leg is booked in Singapore and 
either ‘(a) both parties… are resident or have presence in Singapore; or (b) one party… is a 
resident or has presence in Singapore and the other would have been subject to the [clearing 
obligation] if it had been resident or had presence in Singapore’.12 Thus, if none of the parties 
involved are residents or have a presence in Singapore, then the transaction need not be 
submitted for clearing pursuant to the proposed Singapore law. This forms the jurisdictional base 
of Singapore’s clearing obligation. 
However, the MAS also proposes that financial and non-financial institutions are only subject to 
the clearing obligation when a firm has considerable exposure to derivatives above a certain 
threshold.13 An exemption is extended to financial institutions that are ‘determined to have 
minimal exposure in derivative contracts’, taking into account the firm’s aggregate exposure and 
product class.14 In addition, the MAS also plans to exclude the hedging transactions of non-
                                                 
12 MAS consultation paper I 3.2.1. 
13 MAS consultation paper I 3.3.1. 
14 MAS consultation paper I 3.3.3.  
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financial institutions from its calculation of derivative exposure15 and to exempt intra-group 
derivatives trading when certain conditions (eg, specific collateralisation) are met.16  
Regarding the second question, the MAS proposes that a CCP does not have to be a local entity. 
Thus, a market participant can submit to a foreign CCP for clearing.17 To address the potential 
supervisory problems that might stem from a foreign country or entity managing the clearing, the 
MAS plans to rely on international regulatory cooperation and oversight.18  
One relevant question that has surfaced is when to submit a trade for clearing. There are two 
aspects of this issue. On the one hand, should transactions made before the enforcement date of 
the clearing obligation be subject to it? This is a problem of ‘backloading’. On the other hand, 
how soon a trade should be submitted to a CCP for clearing? The timeframe might create 
operational issues for market participants. 
To address the backloading issue, the MAS proposes that all outstanding derivative contracts that 
are eligible for clearing obligation with more than one year of maturity should also be subject to 
mandatory centralised clearing19 to increase the potential netting benefits of counterparties (i.e., 
more transactions to be cleared at the same time) and reduce ‘counterparty risks for products 
which are systemically important’.20  
However, the MAS proposal is silent on how quickly a market participant must submit a trade 
for clearing. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the US has recently voted in 
favour of a ‘real time’ approach that requires swaps to be submitted for clearing within 
minutes.21 Clearly, there is a benefit to promoting ‘real time’ clearing. However, how quickly a 
trade must be submitted might have to be balanced along with costs and the time required for a 
credit check.  
                                                 
15 MAS consultation paper I 3.3.5.  
16 MAS consultation paper I 3.3.8. 
17 MAS consultation paper I 3.4.3.  
18 MAS consultation paper I 3.4.3. 
19 MAS consultation paper I 3.5. 
20 MAS consultation paper I 3.5. 
21 Telis Demos, CFTC approves ‘real-time’ swaps clearing, Financial Times 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f5fc2742-72c1-11e1-ae73-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1pujVrN00> accessed 23 March 2012. 
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Regarding the third question, it is apparent that not all derivative transactions are subject to a 
clearing obligation, even in the US and Europe. Similar to the EU’s proposal, the MAS proposes 
the adoption of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches to determine which products 
should be subject to the clearing obligation.22 This might allow market participants more 
flexibility to decide whether a product is suitable for clearing or should be traded in an 
exchange.23  
The MAS does not specify which products will be covered, but plans to ‘exempt foreign 
exchange forwards and swaps from the clearing obligation’24 The main risk associated with these 
derivatives is a settlement risk that is already subject to the international settlement process, 
which means that the danger of systemic risk is not high.25 However, other foreign exchange 
derivatives (eg, currency options, non-deliverable forwards (NDF), and currency swaps (CCS)) 
are not exempted.26 
We can now briefly introduce MAS’s proposal on trade obligation and other issues. First, the 
MAS proposes to follow the approach adopted by CPSS-IOSCO.27 Similar to the EU’s proposed 
regulation, the MAS proposes that all financial and non-financial institutions above a certain 
threshold be required to report their derivative transactions.28 The timing to report a trade is on a 
‘T+1’ (i.e., next business day) basis.29 Market participants must also provide updates throughout 
the life of a transaction.30 The products that are subject to the reporting obligation will initially 
be interest rates, foreign exchanges, and oil derivatives, each of which reflects the nature of 
Singapore’s derivatives market.31 All transactions booked or traded in Singapore must be 
reported.32 
                                                 
22 MAS consultation paper I 3.1.  
23 Cadmus (n 3) 216-217. 
24 MAS consultation paper I 3.1.10. 
25 MAS consultation paper I 3.1.10. 
26 MAS consultation paper I 3.1.10. 
27 MAS consultation paper I 4.4.3. 
28 MAS consultation paper I 4.3.1. 
29 MAS consultation paper I 4.5.1. 
30 MAS consultation paper I 4.4.4. 
31 MAS consultation paper I 4.1.2. 
32 MAS consultation paper I 4.2.3. 
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As a complement to the clearing and reporting obligation, the MAS proposes a definition of the 
‘derivative market’33 and grants more power to authorise and regulate the market regulator’s 
ability to regulate exchange operators,34 clearing-houses,35 and trade repositories.36 The MAS 
also plans to introduce a new type of licence called a ‘non-bank capital market services licence’ 
to complete the regulation of OTC derivatives dealers.37 However, end-users will not be 
regulated under the current proposal.38 
B. The Proposal in Hong Kong 
Under the HKSFC’s proposal, a transaction is eligible and subject to the clearing obligation if: 
(1) a financial institution (including ‘authorised institutions’ (AIs) under the Banking Ordinance 
and ‘licensed corporations’ (LCs) under the Securities and Futures Ordinance) and a Hong Kong 
person is a counterparty or when a financial institution has originated or executed the transaction 
and (2) both counterparties have exceeded the threshold amount.39 However, an exemption is 
granted when both parties are overseas persons and the transaction is subject to mandatory 
clearing in another country (or is exempted by another country).40 Similar to Singapore, the 
HKSFC does not require that a transaction be cleared locally.41 
To avoid over-stretching Hong Kong law, the HKSFC seeks to limit the scope of the clearing 
obligation for overseas financial institutions to those transactions conducted via its Hong Kong 
branch.42 However, for local financial institutions, it does not matter whether a transaction is 
conducted locally or via a foreign branch.43 The HKSFC also further clarifies the meaning of 
‘Hong Kong person’ and ‘overseas person’. A Hong Kong person includes those persons ‘who 
operate from Hong Kong, or who otherwise have a connection with Hong Kong’, including 
                                                 
33 MAS consultation paper I 6.1. 
34 MAS consultation paper I 6.2-6.3. 
35 MAS consultation paper I chapter 7. 
36 MAS consultation paper I chapter 8. 
37 MAS consultation paper I 9.1. 
38 MAS consultation paper I 9.2. 
39 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 110. 
40 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 110. 
41 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 147. 
42 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 113. 
43 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 113. 
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Hong Kong residents and business owners (eg, partnerships), companies, funds managed in 
Hong Kong, or any entity established or registered in Hong Kong.44 
Moreover, the HKSFC proposes that mandatory clearing be required even if a financial 
institution in Hong Kong merely executed a transaction for a client. The term ‘originated or 
executed’ means that a financial institution ‘has negotiated, arranged, confirmed or committed to 
a transaction on behalf of itself or any counterparty to the transaction’45 because most derivative 
transactions are not booked in Hong Kong and the Hong Kong arm of a financial institution is 
usually the sales or trading desk.46 Therefore, the HKSFC believes that the clearing obligation 
will not be effective if it is only imposed on a transaction’s counterparties.47 
Regarding the backloading issue, the HKSFC’s approach differs from Singapore’s. On the one 
hand, the HKSFC agrees that pre-dated outstanding transactions should be considered when 
calculating the clearing threshold.48 On the other hand, the HKSFC does not propose that these 
pre-dated transactions be required to be subject to the clearing obligation.49 Nonetheless, the 
HKSFC seems to expect market participants to submit a trade for clearing voluntarily so that 
they can recoup the netting benefits.50 However, the HKSFC does not specify how quickly a 
trader must submit a transaction for clearing. 
Regarding products that are subject to the clearing obligation, the HKSFC also proposes the 
adoption of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches to determine which products should be 
subject to the clearing obligation.51 The HKSFC notes that the largest markets for OTC 
derivatives in Hong Kong are foreign exchanges (58%, excluding NDFs) and interest rates 
(18%).52 On this basis, the HKSFC proposes the initial limitation of ‘any mandatory reporting 
and clearing obligations to only [interest rate swaps (IRS)] and NDF’.53 Equity-linked 
                                                 
44 HKSFC consultation paper paragraphs 77-78. 
45 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 64. 
46 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 65. 
47 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 66. 
48 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 126. 
49 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 127. 
50 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 127. 
51 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 60.  
52 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 53. 
53 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 56. 
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derivatives are on the watch list.54 However, the HKSFC also indicates that not all IRSs and 
NDFs should be subject to the clearing obligation. Although the list has not been finalised, the 
HKSFC proposes that the degree of standardisation and the availability of CCP for clearing 
services be considered before making a final decision.55 
Regarding the reporting obligation, the HKSFC proposes that a market participant be required to 
report a trade exclusively to a local trade repository.56 A transaction’s eligibility and the 
threshold of the reporting obligation are largely similar to that of the clearing obligation. To 
complement the imposition of the clearing and reporting obligations, the HKSFC also plans to 
amend the regulatory schemes for clearing houses and automated trading services operators57 in 
addition to OTC derivatives market players.58 For this purpose, a new type of regulatory activity 
related to OTC derivative intermediaries will be created.59 
 
III. Legal Issues from Early Proposals 
Although the details of regulatory wordings have not been fully published, some outstanding 
legal issues have been introduced by the current proposals.  
A. Centralised Clearing Not a Panacea 
It is inherently dangerous to believe that a CCP can comprehensively solve all issues. Even with 
a functional CCP in place, counterparty risk does not disappear with the existence of CCPs.60 A 
CCP may facilitate risk management, clearing and settlements, and collateral arrangements.61 
However, centralised clearing actually results in a further concentration of risk within a few 
CCPs.62 Thus, how to prevent a big CCP from becoming another Lehman Brothers is one of the 
                                                 
54 ibid. 
55 HKSFC consultation paper paragraphs 57 and 60. 
56 HKSFC consultation paper paragraph 47. 
57 HKSFC consultation paper paragraphs 142-145. 
58 HKSFC consultation paper paragraphs 157-158. 
59 HKSFC consultation paper paragraphs 159-163. 
60 Pirrong (n 2) 5. 
61 C Chamorro-Courtland, ‘Counterparty Substitution in Central Counterparty (CCP) Systems’ 
(2011) 26 BFLR 517, 518. 
62 Kress (n 2) 72-73. 
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main challenges of future regulators.63 Ensuring the legal certainty of the entire clearing scheme 
is equally important64 and can be further examined in light of the fact that major exchanges and 
clearing houses are often owned by big banks and major market dealers, which produces further 
competition and accessibility concerns.65 The proposals in Singapore and Hong Kong also reflect 
this point because regulators in both countries plan to strengthen the licensing scheme and 
regulation of CCPs for OTC derivative transactions. For example, the MAS proposes to grant the 
regulator a power to intervene into the rule-making process of a CCP and require a CCP to have 
proper risk management mechanism in place.66 In addition, the MAS also proposes to have more 
control on the ownership of a CCP.67 
Traditionally, a CCP has been able to protect itself from the default or insolvency of a market 
participant through several means. First, only the clearing members of a CCP can ultimately 
directly submit a trade to a CCP. Thus, a CCP protects itself by imposing rules to ensure the 
insolvency of a clearing member and, in turn, the solvency of a clearing member’s customers. 
Meanwhile, credit risk can be reduced through a series of contracts.  
Second, a CCP can settle a clearing member’s contradictory trading positions through netting, 
which leaves only the price differences to be settled. This allows a CCP (and a clearing member) 
to control the net exposure of counterparty risk.68 It may also promote market liquidity.69 
However, netting opposite trading positions is not as simple as ‘setting off’ opposing monetary 
flows in common law. As in an exchange, it is the setting off of opposing ‘contracts’. The right 
to receive payment and the obligation to deliver the underlying assets (if required) are also 
discharged. Thus, it is essential that the CCP be insolvency-proof and that the netting process be 
protected from insolvency law when one clearing member is in trouble.  
                                                 
63 Cadmus (n 3) 223. 
64 See generally, Chamorro-Courtland (n 61) 520-521. 
65 M Greenberger, ‘Overwhelming A Financial Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight: 
Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-
trillion Dollar Derivatives Market’ (2011) 6 J Bus & Tech 127, 158. 
66 See MAS Consultation Paper II Annex I. 
67 Ibid. 
68 TPW Sullivan, ‘Swapped Disincentives: Will Clearinghouses mitigate the Unintended Effects 
the Bankruptcy Code’s Swap Exemptions?’ (2011) 80 Fordham L Rev 1491, 1501-1502. 
69 Sullivan (n 68) 1503. 
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Third, another distinct feature of the futures market is the ‘margin’ requirement.70 When 
conducting a transaction, a trader must pay a certain amount of cash or collateral into the account 
(the ‘initial margin’) to guarantee performance. By applying this ‘mark-to-market’ approach on a 
daily basis, the CCP adjusts the amount in the margin account to reflect a trading position’s daily 
profits or losses. If the money in the margin account drops below a certain level, the trader must 
inject more money (the ‘maintenance margin’) into the account; otherwise, the trader’s positions 
will be liquidated. In this way, clearing houses are able to protect themselves from default by 
forcing traders to liquidate their trading positions when the margin accounts are still capable of 
absorbing losses.  
The fact that we rarely see the collapse of a CCP may provide proof that these regimes can work 
to reduce counterparty and systemic risks. Nonetheless, it would be foolish to claim that CCPs 
are safe from financial troubles. First, while the collapse of a CCP itself might be rare, a large 
portion of effort is devoted to CCPs’ immunity to the default or solvency of traders. Second, the 
effectiveness of margin and financial requirements also depend on their enforcement. Any lapse 
or human error might decrease the quality of the collateral received, such that the 
mismanagement of a CCP or even market manipulation could cost a CCP dearly. Compared to 
other regulated financial institutions (eg, banks and insurance companies), higher capital 
adequacy requirements and other internal control regimes certainly do not reduce the chance of 
insolvency to zero. Moreover, the ability to access a CCP may pose another problem, especially 
when CCPs are controlled by a few market dealers and other market participants do not have 
cheap access to the clearing system.71 
How far regulators are willing to go to ensure that a CCP is ‘bullet-proof’72 should continue to be 
monitored in the future. The usual tools to this end are licensing, high capital requirements, and 
corporate governance. However, only time will prove the sufficiency of these measures. This 
issue is particularly significant for regulators outside the US and Europe because some trade 
might be cleared by more established CCPs in the Western world. In summary, centralised 
                                                 
70 Pirrong (n 2) 7-9. 
71 FSA (n 5) 4.14. 
72 Michael Mackenzie, Call for ‘bulletproof’ clearing houses Financial Times (22 March 2012) 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eacb29cc-7451-11e1-9e4d-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1qHu38kmo> accessed 28 March 2012. 
12 
 
clearing is a good idea, but it is certainly not a panacea when addressing the problems created by 
OTC derivatives.  
B. Extra-territorial Effect of OTC Derivatives Regulation 
Singapore and Hong Kong must address the problems inherent in the fragmentation of the 
clearing market and in the extra-territorial effects of regulation. There are two aspects: (1) a local 
regulator to regulate transactions cleared by an overseas CCP and (2) the local clearing of 
overseas derivative transactions.  
The clearing market has been dominated by US and European giants, particularly after several 
rounds of mergers and the consolidation of exchanges and clearing houses that have occurred in 
the past decade. Not only are these CCPs already well equipped to grab the clearing market, but 
also they might achieve an economic scale that newcomers cannot match. Apart from the 
solvency of a CCP and its members, liquidity also matters for the success of a CCP and a 
mandatory clearing scheme. Thus, a fragmented market is not necessarily better.73 Having 
recognised this point, neither Singapore nor Hong Kong proposes to restrain market participants 
to the local clearance of OTC derivative transactions (subject to certain conditions). 
However, if clearing through a foreign CCP is allowed, Singapore and Hong Kong face an 
additional problem: the extra-territorial effect of financial regulation in the US and Europe. It is 
difficult to evaluate the impact of extra-territorial effect because regulations are still being 
finalised, but it has the potential to raise legal uncertainties among Asian traders (eg, one trader 
might be subject to clearing obligations in two different markets). This might also serve as an 
opportunity, however, for Singapore and/or Hong Kong to compete with incumbents such as 
London, Chicago, or New York City for OTC derivatives trading. 
The harmonisation of global rules for clearing and reporting obligations might reduce the chance 
of regulatory arbitrage and deter the ‘race to the bottom’ that would result. The Financial 
Stability Board, IOSCO, and some trans-national organisations are moving in this direction. 
However, the results will only be seen when the details of these rules are published in major 
financial markets before the end of 2012.  
                                                 
73 MAS consultation paper I 3.4.2. 
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Global regulatory cooperation might also help Singapore and Hong Kong tackle the problems 
produced by locally traded, foreign-cleared transactions. The standardisation of reporting formats 
and more transparency in trading and clearing data might reduce the uncertainties faced by local 
regulators. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether regulatory cooperation will sufficiently 
prevent traders from arbitrage differences and legal gaps in different countries.  
Another issue stems from the rules of self-regulatory bodies (eg, clearing rules or guidelines for 
trade associations), particularly in relation to those CCPs with global reach. It could be argued 
that these rules might create a new form of lex mercatoria.74 The clearing rules of CCPs will 
eventually determine how centralised clearing will work given the regulatory framework of the 
CCP’s home country.   
To date, the proposals in Singapore and Hong Kong have only considered transactions with some 
local elements. There is a higher level of concern regarding how far Singapore or Hong Kong 
will go to allow the clearing of an entirely foreign transaction by a local CCP. There are two 
sides to this argument. On the one hand, it can be argued that it is better to export risk to another 
country rather than importing such exposure. On the other hand, attracting foreign transactions 
for local clearing might increase market liquidity and help either city state fill the gap in this 
aspect of financial services in Asia. This offers another perspective in observing the drafting and 
implementation of mandatory clearing rules in Singapore and Hong Kong.  
C. Scope of Clearing Obligation: Who 
In both Singapore and Hong Kong, the clearing obligation will be imposed if at least one party is 
a resident or has presence in Singapore (assuming that the clearing threshold has been passed). It 
does not matter whether a party is a financial institution, the most special feature of the 
HKSFC’s proposal is that it requires mandatory clearing, even if a financial institution in Hong 
Kong merely executes a transaction for a client (i.e., the financial institution is not a party). This 
requires transactions to be subject to the clearing obligation even when they are not booked in 
Hong Kong (although it could still be cleared by an eligible overseas CCP).  
Hong Kong’s proposal that the clearing obligation be extended to include transactions 
‘originated or executed’ by a financial institution may lead to an interesting result. If a trade is 
                                                 
74 C Chamorro-Courtland, ‘Central Counterparties (CCP) and the New Transnational Lex 
Mercatoria’ (2011) Fla St U Bus Rev 57, 70.   
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not registered in a firm’s trading book, it might prompt the double clearing of the transaction if 
the customer (as principal) also submits a trade for clearing. This rule to extend the clearing 
obligation to a firm ‘originating or executing’ a transaction (other than being a counterparty) 
would be most beneficial in catching transactions conducted by foreigners via the trading units in 
Hong Kong. However, a one-size-fits-all approach, regardless of the underlying relationship 
between a financial institution and a client, could ultimately cause legal problems. In the worst 
case, financial firms would simply opt to relocate their derivatives trading business to other 
countries if trading does not have to be conducted in Hong Kong. We will see how the HKSFC 
carve out the technical details of this rule when a draft is submitted.  
The clearing obligation may also have a residual effect on the issuers or sellers of structured 
investment products. Take Lehman minibonds as an example. The issuer entered into a swap 
with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (a US company) for an issue of structured note.75 
Because the issuer was structured as a local company, the swap would have been subject to the 
clearing obligation under current proposals in Hong Kong and Singapore. Precisely how 
centralised clearing might affect investors of structured investment products remains unclear. 
There is a certain degree of legal uncertainty in this regard, particularly for products sold or 
issued before the enforcement of the clearing obligation.  
Ultimately, whether the law should exempt some groups from the clearing obligation is 
arguable.76 Such exemptions have been proposed in both Singapore and Hong Kong. On the one 
hand, if such exemptions proved too wide, they might undermine the effectiveness of the 
clearing obligation. On the other hand, if such exemptions proved too narrow, many market 
participants might refrain from entering into hedging transactions due to the higher transaction 
costs. As the worldwide regulatory rules are being finalised, they offer another angle of 
comparison to the rules in different financial markets.  
D. Subject-matter: Products 
Only a portion of OTC derivatives will be subject to the clearing obligation, even in the US and 
Europe. Regulators and market participants must consider factors such as the standardisation of 
                                                 
75 C Chen, ‘Product Due Diligence and the Suitability of Minibonds: Taking the Benefit of 
Hindsight’ [2011] Sing JLS 309, 313-314. 
76 JA Liabo, ‘The New Threat to Financial Reform: The End-user Exception to Dodd-Frank 
Mandatory Swap Clearance’ (2011) 45 J Marhsall L Rev 117, 127-135.  
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terms, product complexity, and liquidity.77 Thus, some OTC derivatives will always remain 
‘over-the-counter’, but there could be several policy and legal issues regarding product class that 
will be subject to the clearing obligation. 
One of the types of derivatives envisaged is the credit default swap that dominates the discussion 
at the height of the global financial crisis. Interest rate swaps, which enjoyed the highest trading 
volume (in terms of notional amount), are also a reasonable target. However, to date, Singapore 
and Hong Kong seem to be content with only interest rate-linked or foreign exchange-linked 
derivatives. Interestingly, no commodity or credit derivatives are mentioned.78 While these 
products may still be covered in the future, it is clear that the current target is the foreign 
exchange and interest rate markets. On the one hand, this may simply reflect the reality of a 
market in which interest rates and foreign exchanges represent the lion’s share of the derivatives 
market in the two cities. On the other hand, this also represents an opportunity for regulatory 
competition. Because the main trading hubs for commodities derivatives and other financial 
derivatives are all outside Asia, excluding commodities derivatives (eg, oil or gold derivatives) 
from the clearing obligation might help Singapore and Hong Kong compete with the likes of 
London, Chicago, or New York while grabbing more of the Chinese market when market 
participants are given more liberty to trade these products. We will see if this is what happens in 
the future. 
Another issue is whether all standardised products must be subject to centralised clearing. In 
September 2009, the G20 leaders agreed in Pittsburgh that ‘[a]ll standardised OTC derivative 
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and 
cleared through central counterparties by end-2012’.79 However, the EU has not endorsed this 
position.80  
Apparently, it is easier and more appropriate to clear derivatives when the contract terms and 
product specifications are largely standardised to maximise the netting effect. However, it has 
                                                 
77 Pirrong (n 2) 17-18. 
78 Nonetheless, the MAS proposes that oil derivatives be subjected to the reporting obligation. 
79 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories, COM(2010) 484 final, 2010/0520(COD), 
Explanatory Memorandum 2. 
80 MS Barr, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform’ (2012) 29 Yale J on Reg 91, 118. 
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been argued that standardisation is not necessarily a good thing. The meaning of ‘standardised’ 
may be uncertain enough in practice to cause more legal risk and room for arbitrage if the term is 
used as a criteria for the clearing obligation.81 One may further question how standard 
documentation is produced in the first place.82 Moreover, unstandardised contracts have, in fact, 
been cleared by some CCPs.83 A more powerful attack is to argue that the decision to accept a 
product for clearing should be made by CCPs (which are usually private entities) rather than by 
generic legal wording to avoid making CCPs more vulnerable when accepting products that are 
unsuitable for clearing.84 This offers a new way to perceive how the G20’s proposal will be 
implemented in major financial markets. 
Finally, one future issue is the effect of clearing and reporting obligations on the development of 
markets for alternative risk management and derivatives that have not yet hit the mass market, 
but have the potential to become useful tools for businesses and consumers.85 Weather and 
longevity derivatives are good examples of such potential derivatives. Although there is 
currently no urgent need to subject these new products to mandatory clearing and/or reporting, 
how far the market for these products will develop might depend on the success and problems of 
centralised clearing and trade reporting. 
E. Definitional Issues 
As long as there is a statutory requirement on clearing and reporting, legislators and regulators 
must come up with ways to define a ‘derivative’. However, this task is not as simple as it appears 
to be. Although widely traded by financial institutions, there is no comprehensive definition of a 
‘derivative’ in Singapore or Hong Kong law for general purposes. Hong Kong’s Securities and 
Futures Ordinance produced a definition of ‘derivative’ specifically regarding market 
misconduct (i.e., insider dealings and market manipulations) and the disclosure of interests.86 
                                                 
81 JP Braithwaite, ‘The Inherent Limits of "Legal Devices": Lessons for the Public Sector's 
Central Counterparty Prescription for the OTC Derivatives Markets’ (2011) 12 European 
Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 87,106-107. 
82 Braithwaite (n 81) 107. 
83 Braithwaite (n 81) 108. 
84 Braithwaite (n 81) 108-109. 
85 See generally, LC Ariail, ‘The Impact of Dodd-Frank on End-users Hedging Commercial Risk 
in Over-the-counter Derivatives Markets’ (2011) 15 NC Banking Inst 175. 
86 Eg Hong Kong Securities and Futures Ordinance ss 245, 285, and 308. 
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However, this definition must be adapted if it is to be successfully applied within a much wider 
context.87 
In general, a financial derivative is often defined as a ‘financial instrument whose values depend 
on (or derive from) the values of other, more basic underlying variables’.88 The problem with a 
legal definition of this kind is that it is too descriptive and can be over-inclusive because the term 
‘derivative’ can be applied to a broad range of transactions, each of which may also be defined 
using generic words, such as ‘a vague description of the mechanism by which something is 
priced or valued does not provide policy makers and regulators valuable insights about how that 
thing might be best regulated’.89 If a definition is too narrowly worded, it provides loopholes that 
market participants can exploit. If a definition is too general, it may inadvertently cover 
unintended transactions. For example, an airline might enter into an agreement with an energy 
company to purchase a certain amount of petroleum in advance with the delivery scheduled in 
three months-time. Technically, such a transaction might be defined as a ‘forward contract’, but 
in effect it is a contract of the sale of goods for future delivery. This problem underlies a long list 
of US case laws.  
Definition issues do not disappear even when regulators use more technical terms to define a 
‘derivative’. While terms like ‘option’, ‘forward’ and ‘futures’ are more or less standardised and 
understandable, swaps provide the biggest challenge to lawmakers. There are so many ways to 
exchange cash flows. To use credit derivatives as an example, they can be structured as ‘total 
return swaps’ with a total return structure or with a default structure that makes them ‘credit 
default swaps’. Some interest rate swaps might also be linked to the same debt instrument 
underlying a credit derivative. They are all called swaps, but they are founded on different 
structures and different valuation models. Even worse, parties might enter into exotic swaps that 
are nothing like the abovementioned ‘plain vanilla’ variety. How to effectively ‘set off’ positions 
taken under different swaps will prove challenging to CCPs and regulators.  
                                                 
87 For example, the definition of ‘derivative’ in the context of market misconduct refers to ‘listed 
securities’. See Hong Kong Securities and Futures Ordinance s 245. 
88 J Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives 1 (6th edn, Prentice Hall, 2006). 




In Europe and the UK, some swaps might simply be defined as a ‘contract for differences’ to 
avoid definition problems. However, if a ‘contract for differences’ is defined as being too wide, 
virtually all betting contracts or an agreement to set off mutual payments between two parties 
could become a contract for differences. A contract for differences also cannot cover derivative 
transactions that allow physical delivery, as some credit default swaps or energy derivatives do. 
Thus, the possibility of regulatory over-shoot still exists.  
It has been argued that a more precise definition of ‘derivatives’ will lead to better regulatory 
schemes.90 Nonetheless, how ‘precise’ a definition is precise enough may become a chicken-egg 
problem. It may be the author’s speculation that a functional definition of ‘derivative’ might 
cause problems in the future, similar to those we have seen regarding securities, futures, 
insurance, and even simple deposits. However, the legal uncertainty associated with an 
inappropriate definition is not unforeseeable. Because not all OTC derivatives will be subject to 
the clearing and reporting obligations, it is only a matter of time before financial innovation 
drives the boundary of financial regulation to its limit.  
F. Gap in Documentation 
The clearing of OTC derivatives requires additional contractual arrangements to make it work. 
Thus, the ‘legal device’ of contract law is instrumental in reaching the promised land of 
centralised clearing. For this purpose, the current regulatory proposals in Singapore and Hong 
Kong (and the US) seem to ignore the part about contracts when ascertaining the foundation of 
OTC derivatives clearing. 
Unlike exchange trading, OTC derivatives transactions are not conducted pursuant to a series of 
mutual (eg, brokerage agreement) and multilateral (eg, exchange membership agreements and 
rules) agreements that, which provide the basic framework of exchange trading and clearing. 
OTC clearing is based on intervention of law rather than mutual agreements. One might argue 
that a certain degree of documentation standardisation has been achieved by the master 
agreement system provided by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). 
However, the purpose of the ISDA master agreement scheme is to provide a contractual platform 
that allows contractual parties to conduct futures trades within a bilateral framework, similar to a 
bilateral version of exchange rules, but only binding between the two contractual parties. 
                                                 
90 Lynch (n 89) 30.  
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Because it is bilateral in nature, the ISDA master agreement still allows contractual parties to 
negotiate different terms in the schedule or in confirmations.91 Furthermore, an ISDA master 
agreement between Banks A and B would not necessarily be identical to one between Banks A 
and C. Banks A and B might also sign ISDA master agreements with different terms in the 
schedules to govern different types of transactions. The ‘set off’ and novation processes are 
bound to be more complicated than exchange contracts. Even a minor difference in exclusion 
clauses or waivers could make a huge difference.  
Another challenge is the concept of a ‘single contract’ cornering the ISDA master agreement 
system.92 The benefit of this approach is that it allows payment netting between A and B,93 early 
termination and determination of the close-out amount,94 and the calculation of collateral (similar 
to margin, subject to the Credit Support Annex). The novation of one transaction (specified by a 
confirmation and as part of a ‘single contract’ along with other transactions under the ISDA 
master agreement) would require careful contractual drafting to avoid interpretation problems in 
the future. For example, it is not hard to imagine that a non-defaulting party might attempt to 
claim a close-out amount by counting on a transaction that has been submitted to a CCP by the 
defaulting counterparty when the non-defaulting party was in the money. In another example, 
one must also consider the effect of trades that have been submitted to clearing and have been 
denied clearance by a clearing member. These problems must be solved on contractual grounds. 
Unfortunately, it is currently unclear how CCPs in Singapore and Hong Kong will cope with this 
documentation gap. 
In June 2011, the ISDA published a Cleared Derivatives Execution Agreement (ISDA execution 
agreement) in cooperation with the Futures Industry Association to offer a contractual platform 
for the execution phase of OTC clearing.95 This execution agreement provided some fallback 
options for when a trade is not accepted for clearing but has not necessarily amounted to an event 
                                                 
91 The ISDA Master Agreement, no matter in 1992 or 2002 version, can be divided into four 
main parts: master agreement (which is standardised), schedule (subject to negotiation by 
parties), confirmation (details of each individual trade) and credit support annex (CSA, if 
signed). 
92 ISDA master agreement s 1(c). 
93 ISDA master agreement s 2(c). 
94 ISDA master agreement s 6. 
95 See <http://www2.isda.org> accessed 14 March 2012å. 
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of default. It also provided additional fallback options for parties to explore (eg, treating a trade 
as a separate transaction not governed by the execution agreement or simply choosing to pay an 
early termination amount for a trade).96 This execution agreement was provided as a template for 
market participants and may be subject to change after the finalisation of OTC regulations in the 
US and Europe. Parties adopting this execution agreement might also attempt to bring their 
clearing members (if they agree) in as parties in this agreement.97 
Finally, governing laws and jurisdictions have become a source of concern. One lesson learned 
from the recent financial crisis is that even a small crack in the documentation of a financial 
transaction can result in lengthy legal proceedings in different countries. Because Singapore and 
Hong Kong’s proposals for clearing obligations will apply if the transaction has a local party, 
there is also a chance that the governing law of the underlying OTC transaction will be different 
from that of the clearing venue. Because Singapore and Hong Kong are both former British 
colonies, legal uncertainty regarding the local clearing of OTC transactions governed by British 
and/or New York law might be minimal. However, if a transaction were subject to a system 
outside the common law jurisdiction, it could be hard to say what might happen in the future.  
G. Moral Hazards 
Other possible results of mandatory clearing include potential moral hazards. If counterparty risk 
is reduced by centralised clearing, it might translate into market participants exercising even 
greater freedom in making even riskier trades. In fact, the clearing obligation does not seek to 
restrain purely speculative trading. In contrast, it might actually encourage it.98 Because market 
participants typically know the market of a specific instrument better than the CCP, there is also 
the problem of adverse selection.99 Some might argue that the costs of clearing (including the 
requirement to pay margins) might deter some risk-takers.100 Nonetheless, margins are similar to 
leverage trading, in which one pays little in advance while taking chances in the market. Thus, 
transaction costs are not a perfect deterrent for excessive risk-taking.  
                                                 
96 ISDA execution agreement s 4. 
97 See <http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/Memorandum-
ClearedDerivativesExecutionAgreement-June142001.pdf> accessed 14 March 2012. 
98 See also Awrey (n 11) 177-178. 
99 Pirrong (n 2) 14; Awrey (n 11) 175-177. 
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Insurance law offers a natural comparison. Under English insurance law, which is to a certain 
extent followed by both Singapore and Hong Kong, moral hazards are controlled a number of 
ways. On the one hand, a duty of utmost good faith and a duty of disclosure are created to ensure 
the equity of information advantage.101 On the other hand, insurers can create so-called 
‘warranties’ to regulate the conduct of the insured.102 A breach of such an insurance ‘warranty’ 
under English insurance law would comprehensively relieve an insurer of all future liabilities. 
Thus, insurers are often called ‘surrogate regulators’ because they are in the position of 
regulating the conduct of insurers via insurance policies.  
No similar legal doctrines exist in the derivatives sector. On the one hand, the derivatives sector 
has long resisted the idea of treating derivatives as insurance. On the other hand, the ISDA 
master agreement system provides no standard terms to regulate a market participant’s conduct 
once a contract is made. It is then left to market participants to negotiate terms of this kind in the 
schedule of a master agreement if they want one. This dynamic could serve to deter the insurance 
law problem in which insured individuals are often placed in the disadvantaged position of 
having to bargain for warranties or exclusion clauses. However, this also lessens the possibility 
of derivatives dealers acting as ‘surrogate regulators’ because market dealers only care about the 
credit risk of clients and counterparties.  
How best to tackle financial speculation using financial derivatives is a topic that is beyond the 
scope of this article, which focuses on the expectation that there are other problems that could 
result from the mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives. Moral hazards from excessive risk-taking 
are just one of these challenges, and there are several legal tools that can be applied to curtail this 
problem. Higher capital requirements for market dealers, position limits on derivatives trading, 
and the so-called ‘Volcker rule’ all have the potential to restrict excessive risk-taking.103 
Nonetheless, this problem should not be ignored, particularly in the aftermath of the recent 
global financial crisis. 
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H. Trade Reporting Issues 
After examining some of the issues involved in mandatory clearing, we now turn to some of the 
potential issues regarding trade reporting in the future. Apart from efforts to standardise the 
format of trade reporting around the world, this article indicates two areas that might be fraught 
with legal problems in the future.  
First, there are concerns regarding access to disclosed information. We wonder whether trading 
information will be made available to the general public, and if so, whether a market participant 
will be able to ask for such information. There could be potential privacy issues if the general 
public is allowed access to market participants’ trading positions. Whether an investor or non-
party member of a transaction should enjoy the right to check the records of any other market 
participants’ trading positions will be an issue that regulators and trade repositories must 
consider.  
Second, we question whether there will be any civil liability for misrepresentation or mistakes in 
the reported information. We have seen a considerable amount of case law with regard to the 
disclosure of material information in the securities market. In insurance law, insurance contract 
law also handles false information with different rules (eg, duty of disclosure, warranties, and 
condition precedents). Apart from penalties and/or administrative remedies, it remains unclear 
whether there will be any civil remedy available in Singapore and Hong Kong with regard to 
reporting false trade information. This is an area worth monitoring in the future.  
IV. Conclusion 
In summary, the final details of OTC derivatives regulation are taking shape in major financial 
markets in 2012. Hong Kong and Singapore have indicated how the derivatives market will be 
regulated in the future, but how effective the clearing and reporting obligations ultimately are 
will depend on how the relevant rules are drafted and enforced.104 While we are still waiting for a 
draft of final rules, this article indicates some of the potential legal and policy issues. First, 
centralised clearing is not a panacea. Instead, there are several multi-national ‘mammoth’ CCPs 
that, if they were to fail, would do so with devastating results. Second, Singapore and Hong 
Kong both face challenges in global regulatory cooperation and addressing extra-territorial 
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regulatory effects. Third, the scope of the clearing obligations will determine whether there is 
any regulatory competition or room for regulatory arbitrage in the future. This also has further 
implications for alternative risk management. Fourth, there are legal definition problems with 
regard to the concept of ‘derivatives’ and its sub-categories that may provide grounds for future 
litigation. Although centralised clearing might create a sense of security in the short-term, there 
are bound to be potential problems that warrant the close monitoring of future legal and market 
developments.  
 
 
